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Abstract—As the next generation of power system, smart grid 
provides people with great convenience in efficiency and quality. 
It supports the two-way communication and extremely improves 
the efficiency of utilization of energy resource. In order to 
dispatch accurately and support the dynamic price, a lot of 
smart meters are installed at user’s house to collect the real-time 
data. However, all these collected data are related to user 
privacy. In this paper, we propose a data aggregation scheme 
based on secret sharing with error tolerance in smart grid, which 
ensures that the control center gets the integrated data without 
revealing users’ privacy. Meanwhile, we also consider the 
differential privacy and error tolerance during the data 
aggregation. At last, we analyze the security of our scheme and 
carry out experiments to validate the results. 
Keywords—data aggregation; secret share; error tolerance; 
differential privacy. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
As a new generation of energy network, smart grid is 
considered a useful way to solve the severe environment and 
resource problems. It is the combination of energy network 
and information technology. Differing from the traditional grid, 
the control mode of the smart grid is more flexible and reliable. 
It supports bidirectional power flow between the users and grid. 
To realize the optimal scheduling, smart grid installs a smart 
meter at each house to collect the real-time data .Not only that, 
smart grid also adopts many new service modes. For example, 
the dispatch center can make the dynamic price to encourage 
users to adjust their power consumption behaviors, collect the 
electricity consumption requirements and create the electricity 
generation plan in advance. 
Although smart grid has many advantages in those aspects, 
there also exist several risks which may disclose user privacy. 
An adversary can infer user’s family behaviors through his 
real-time data. For example, when you get up, when you go to 
work, when you take a shower and so on. Thus, thieves may 
gain entry to user’s house when they notice that there is 
nobody home. Therefore, the privacy-preserving in smart grid 
becomes an extremely important problem which can hamper 
the implement of smart grid. 
For the privacy-preserving in smart grid, many scholars 
have proposed various solutions. As we know, the privacy-
preserving strategy can be divided into two ways. One is to 
hide the user's identity, the other way is to protect the user's 
real-time power data. In this paper, we adopt the Paillier 
cryptosystem which is a homomorphic encryption scheme to 
realize the data aggregation and use the secret sharing scheme 
to realize the differential privacy and realize the error tolerance 
through the substitution strategy. The process of our scheme is 
shown in figture1. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces the related work. Section III shows the system 
model and design goals. In section IV, some preliminaries are 
given. In section V, our scheme is stated. In section VI, 
security analysis is given. In Section VII, the performance of 
our scheme is evaluated. In Section VIII, the paper is 
concluded. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
To protect the privacy of users in smart grid, many scholars 
have proposed various strategies. These strategies can be 
classified into two aspects: 1) protect user’s privacy by 
masking the real identity; 2) protect user’s privacy by masking 
their real-time data. 
 Some works are focused on masking user’s identity. A 
simple solution adopting a trusted- party to manage the identity 
list is proposed in [1]. However, finding a trusted-party is not 
easy. Cheung proposes a scheme based on blind signature to 
solve the privacy-preserving and validity-authentication in [2]. 
It ensures that the verifier can authenticate sender’s signature 
while has no information about his privacy. The downside of 
this scheme is that users should send their electricity data to 
the third party for authentication before communicating with 
the control center, which is against with the real-time property. 
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya propose a scheme named CL -
Signature scheme which is similar to the blind signature in [3]. 
An effective scheme based on virtual ring is presented in [4]. It 
groups the users by their geographical positions and distributes 
each member in the same group with the same ID. In this way, 
control center can obtain all of the users’ data without knowing 
the senders’ ID. Obviously, it’s a good way to protect user 
privacy, but the validity-authentication can’t be guaranteed 
because of the anonymity. Privacy-preserving scheme based 
on pseudonym is also very common such as [5], and it always 
combines with the ring signature or blind signature to mask 
user’s identity.  
Some works are focused on masking user’s real-time data. 
A solution using a battery to hide the real-time data is 
proposed in [6]. In this scheme, smart grid and the household 
battery provide users with electricity at the same time to mask 
the electricity data. The downside of this method is that the 
battery charging and discharging frequently may reduce the 
lifetime of battery. Data aggregation is also popular in smart 
grid for privacy-preserving. The Paillier encryption and Bone-
Goh-Nission encryption are classical homomorphic encryption 
algorithms for data aggregation and they are used in many 
schemes such as [7]-[10]. However, the computational 
complexity of them can’t be ignored. In [11], Jo tries to group 
the members to realize a distributed authentication in order to 
reduce the complexity, but the effect is not very ideal. The 
bilinear mapping is also a common solution for data 
aggregation. We usually use the bilinear mapping to create 
homomorphic encryption such as [12]. Remarkably, it is often 
used to realize the key-exchange. Secret sharing scheme is 
proposed to realize the data aggregation. It adopts the Shamir 
technique to encrypt the electricity data [13]. It divides a secret 
into different pieces and distributes them to various entities in 
smart grid. Only the control center acquires fixed number of 
shares, can he get the integral secret. Dong, Xiaolei, J. Zhou, 
and Z. Cao propose a simple solution to aggregate the real-
time data in [14], it constructs an equation 2
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the SMs share the same value of S , but it would increase the 
traffic in the network. In [15], Beussink, A shows a scheme 
based on data obfuscation, which adds a random number to 
each electricity data, but it will cause some large errors if the 
random numbers are not reasonable. In [7], Shi, Z and Sun, R 
discuss about the error tolerant and differential privacy.  It 
groups all the users in smart grid and drops a group if this 
group has a malfunctioning smart meter. However, the error 
rate and computational complexity is not very ideal and we 
will compare our solution with this scheme at below. 
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Fig.1 System Model 
 
III.  SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS 
A. System model 
As shown in figure 1, smart grid is divided into four parts, 
which are comprised of the control center (CC), the Key 
initialization center (KIC), the data aggregation device (DA), 
and residential users. 
1) Residential users 
We divide all of the users into different groups in 
accordance with their geographical locations and the number 
of users in each group is the same. Each residential user is 
installed with a smart meter (SM) to collect the real-time data 
of the house applications .it can encrypt the data by paillier 
encryption and send these encrypted data to the data 
aggregation device.  
2) Data aggregation device 
The data aggregation device is responsible for collecting all 
the data sent by SMs, calculating the sum of real-time data and 
uploading to the control center. In addition, it has a fault-
tolerant function. When a smart meter is malfunctioning in a 
group, his data would be replaced by the other group’s SM 
which has the same secret key. 
 3) Key initialization center 
The key initialization center is responsible for initializing 
all of the keys for SMs. It produces private keys by secret 
sharing scheme. Additionally, each group has the same number 
of smart meters, and the keys assigned to each group 
correspond to equal. 
 4) Control center 
The control center can acquire a summary of real–time data 
in smart grid. With these data, the CC can get the trend of   
power consumption and make the power generation plan or 
dynamic price immediately. 
B. Design goals 
Considering the above scenarios, our design goals are as 
follows: 
1) Privacy-preserving.  
A residential user’s data are inaccessible to any other users.  
No matter the outside adversary or CC should not acquire the 
real-time data of users even if he knows the cipher text and 
encryption algorithms. 
2) Differential privacy  
Differential privacy refers to the problem of preventing 
users from compromising privacy during the data aggregation 
process. The common construction method is as follows. 
For two formulas during the data aggregation: 
1 1 2 ...sum nC C C C=                                                                   (1) 
2 1 2 1...sum n nC C C C C +=                                                            (2) 
The data aggregation device can compute 1sumM  and 
2sumM  by corresponding homomorphic encryption. Then, the 
plain text of the 1nSM +  will be disclosed easily through 
1 2 1n sum sumM M M+ = −                                                           (3) 
We call this attack method differential attack, and the 
common solution is adding a random number into the data. 
However, this solution would increase some errors. Finding a 
novel solution which can protect differential privacy while has 
low error rate is our design goal. 
3) Error-tolerance 
Only the data aggregation device collects all the SMs’ data, 
can he acquire the sum of the data. If there is a SM damaged, 
the data aggregation can’t run in the right way. Therefore, 
when there is a malfunctioning SM in a group, we must ensure 
the data aggregation still run normally. 
IV.  PRELIMINARIES 
A. Notations 
Table1.  Notations 
Acronym Descriptions 
ID Identification number 
SM Smart meter 
CC  Control center 
KIC Key initialization center 
DA Data aggregation device 
eo The error rate of our scheme 
eD The error rate of DG-APED 
t  Time stamp 
Mi Plaintext of SMi 
Ci Ciphertext of SMi 
r Random number 
OS Our scheme 
B. Paillier cryptosystem 
Paillier cryptosystem is an asymmetric encryption 
algorithm, which has additive homomorphism properties. It 
includes three procedures: key generation, encryption and 
decryption. 
1) Key generation 
Chooses two prime numbers p, q and calculates n pq= . g 
is a generator of cyclic group 2 *nZ , and  
2gcd( ( mod ), ) 1L g n nλ = . The public key is ( , )n g , and the 
private key is λ . 
( 1, 1)lcm p qλ = − − .                                                            (4) 
2) Encryption phase 
For the plain text nm Z∈  ，we can select a random 
number r n< . Then, the ciphertext can be calculated as 
follows: 
2modm nC g r n=                                                                  (5) 
3) Decryption phase 
After receiving the cipher text C, the receiver can get the 
plain text m with the secret key λ  by the following formula 
2
2
( mod ) mod
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λ
λ= .                                                   (6) 
C. Secret sharing scheme 
The secret sharing scheme is a scheme which splits a 
secret into n pieces and distributes these pieces with different 
valid members. If an adversary captures a member in the 
system, he can only get a piece of the secret. Only if the 
adversary get at least k pieces of the secret, can he get the 
whole secret. We usually adopt a Shamir technique to realize 
this result.  
The trusted-party chooses a polynomial to split a secret . 
2 1
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( , )i ix y  is the corresponding share. Remarkably, the 
Shamir secret sharing scheme is the fully homomorphic and 
can be designed as a better scheme to realize the data 
aggregation. According to the lagrange interpolation 
polynomial, we have  
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Then, we can easily compute p as follows: 
1
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D. Log normal distribution 
Log normal distribution is a distribution in the 
mathematics field that many phenomena follow. 
Research [16] shows that the real-time data follow the 
log normal distribution. We can easily get the 
expectation by the probability density function of the 
distribution as follows: 
The probability density function 
2
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The expectation 
2
2( )E x e
μ σ+
=                                                                     (12) 
V.  OUR SCHEME 
A. System initialization 
The KIC first chooses two big primes ,p q , and 
computes n pq= . Then, it chooses a generator 1g  from 2
*
n
Z , 
where 21gcd( ( mod ), ) 1L g n n
λ
= and creates 2
qh g= , 
where *2 ng Z∈ .After, it constructs a 
formula 2 11 2 1( ) ...
d
dG x p a x a x a x
−
−
= + + + . All the SMs in 
smart grid are divided into different groups, and each group 
has the d members. For each SM in a group, the KIC assigns 
the private key ( )i{ ,  y , , }ii i xx G x β to the iSM , 
calculates ( 1, 1)lcm p qλ = − −  and sends λ  to the DA. At last, 
it publishes 1 2 1 2( , , , , , )n h H H g g . While, ix is a random 
number representing the SM serial number. iy  is the group 
serial number. H1 andH2 are two hash functions. Particularly, 
the set of SM serial numbers 1 2{ , ,... }dx x x  in each group is the 
same. That is to say, for a special SM, it can find n-1 members 
with the same private key except for the group serial number 
in other groups. When a SM receives the private key, it saves 
{ , , ( ) }
ii i i x
x y G x β  in his database. 
B. Encryption 
The SM collects the electricity data every 15 minutes from 
all the house applications. For the time t, it computes  
( )2( ) mod x ii i G xm ni iC g r t n h
β
=                                             (13) 
1( | ( ) )ii xH t G x β                                                                 (14) 
2 ( | | ( ( ) )ii i xH t C h G x β                                                       (15) 
Then, the SM sends 
1 2{ , , ( | ( ) ), ( | | ( ( ) ))}i ii i i x i i xy C H t G x H t C h G xβ β  to the DA. It 
is worth noting that the serial number of SM ix should be kept 
secret. 
 
C. Data aggregation 
When the DA receives a message from a SM, it verifies 
2 ( | | ( ( ) )ii i xH t C h G x β firstly. If the hash value is right, the 
data aggregation will be performed. Otherwise, the message 
will be dropped. 
1) Normal aggregation  
If the DA receives all the SMs’ data in a group, it runs the 
data aggregation as follows: 
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2) Error tolerance 
If there is a malfunctioning SM in a group, the DA runs the 
following steps: 
First, it compares this group of hash table constituted by 
1( | ( ) )ii xH t G x β  with other complete groups to find the 
malfunctioning SM. 
Then, selects a jSM from other groups with the same hash 
value 1( | ( ) )ii xH t G x β as the malfunctioning iSM  to replace. 
To further reduce the error, the data of jSM  is processed 
before the data aggregation as follows: 
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M  represents the sum of the electricity data of the 
previous period. 'jc  represents the processed data of jc  and 
replaces the missing data ic  to run the data aggregation. 
D. Power dispatching 
After receiving sum of the electricity data in smart grid, 
the CC can draw the real-time load curve and create the 
dynamic price, power generation plan and other scheduling 
strategies. 
 
VI.  SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A Privacy-preserving 
For a SM in smart grid, we can analyze the security of data 
from three aspects: external attacker, DA, CC and malicious 
user with the same private key. 
1) External attacker 
When an external attacker compromises the user's SM, the 
cipher text iC  sent by the user can be obtained. However, 
because the attacker doesn’t know the other d-1 users ’private 
key, it can’t acquire the plain text due to the lack of p. 
2) DA 
After receiving all the data from SMs, the DA can only 
perform the data aggregation and replace the malfunctioning 
one when it’s necessary. However, it can’t obtain the 
decryption key p , therefore, the security of the user's data can 
be ensured. 
3) CC 
The CC can only get all the users’ aggregated data, so it 
can’t snoop to a single user's real-time data. Thus, user’s 
privacy can be ensured in our scheme. 
4) Malicious user 
After receiving the cipher text C, the receiver can get the 
plain text m with the secret key λ  by the following formula:    
22
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λ=                                               (20) 
For a specific SM in a certain group, there are 1n −  SMs 
in the remaining groups according to the design idea of our 
scheme. If a malicious user exists in this set, the privacy of 
the boon SM may be threatened. However, there is no security 
risk in our scheme. For two users with the same key in 
different groups, 
( )2
1 ( ) modi x
m G xn
i iC g r t n h
β
=                                                (21) 
                                         (22) 
 
Even if the malicious user knows the key ( )x ii G xhβ , as they 
do not know the paillier encryption algorithm decryption 
key λ  , so it still can’t acquire the plaintext. 
B. Differential privacy  
Differential attack needs to calculate the integrated data of 
1d + users and the integrated data of d users. After 
computing their difference, the attacker can acquire the 
privacy information of the individual user. For this scheme, 
there is no risk of differential attack. Because the secret 
sharing scheme can only calculate the d users’ integrated data. 
If the number of SMs participating in the data aggregation is 
less than d or more than d, the key p can’t be synthesized.  
C. Error-tolerance 
Data aggregation often involves fault tolerance. In this 
paper, when a certain SM is damaged, it is difficult to 
synthesize the key. Therefore, we adopt the idea of different 
group substitution to realize error tolerance. Because real-time 
data is collected for scheduling, creating the power generation 
strategies, and dynamic price, error caused by substitution is 
negligible for the big data in smart grid. When there are too 
many malfunctioning SMs in smart grid, the KIC should re-
assign the keys. 
VII.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The most important idea of our paper is to use substitution 
to realize the error-tolerance, so it is necessary to prove the 
substitution between two members in different groups to be 
right. Because the real-time data follow the log normal 
distribution, we can use its expectation to calculate the error 
rate.    
'' j
O m
MCS S Me
S NC Ng
−
= = ≈ （g=13）                                 (23)
 
As smart grid is very huge, we suppose the number of SMs 
is from 4000 to 10000 and the number of malfunctioning SMs 
is from 0 to 200. By inputting the number of malfunctioning 
SMs and the total number of the SMs in smart grid into the 
formula (23), we can get the error rates ’curve as figure.2. 
For the number of SMs is from 4000 to 10000, we can find 
that the error rate of our scheme is less than 0.07% in the 
worst case and the average rate is close to 0.02%, which is 
allowed in smart grid for the power scheduling. As the 
formula (23) shows, the error rate is related to the value of 
g .Therefore, we can increase the accuracy by adjusting the 
value of g . 
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Fig.2 The error rate in our scheme 
As far as we know, DG-APED scheme proposed by Shi, 
Zhiguo is also a subtle group-based scheme with error 
tolerance [7]. It adopts the data drop strategy to realize the 
error tolerance during the data aggregation. We calculated the 
computational complexity of the two schemes in error 
processing and show them in the figure.3. 
4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
x 104
the number of SMs
co
m
pu
ta
tio
na
l c
om
pl
ex
ity
 
 
OS
DG-APED
 
Fig.3 The computational complexity 
In addition, we also calculated the error rate of the two 
schemes and show them in figure 4. Our scheme’s error rate 
can be calculated as follows: 
'' j
O m
MCS S Me
S NC Ng
−
= = ≈ （g=13）                                 (23) 
While, the error rate of the DG-APED can be calculated as 
follows: 
1 (1 ) ( ) ( 10)d dD
M Me d
N N
= − − − =                                     (24) 
Through the figure 4, we can find that when the 
malfunction rate (M/N) is less than 0.97, the error rate of our 
scheme would be much lower than DG-APED. While, when 
the malfunction rate is more than 0.97, the system has to 
reassign the keys for all working SMs. Therefore, our scheme 
has great advantage in the accuracy. 
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Fig.4 The error rate of two schemes 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Smart grid is an effective way to resolve the severe 
environment and resource problem. Unfortunately, it also 
causes some privacy-disclosing problems. In this paper, we 
propose a data aggregation scheme based on secret sharing 
scheme and paillier encryption. We achieve the error-
tolerance for the normal aggregation by substitution. 
Therefore, even if there are some malfunctioning SMs in 
smart grid, our scheme can also run in a normal way. In the 
future work, we will focus on combining the real-time data 
privacy with the normal billing. 
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